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This article deals with the role of government in encouraging the decline of radical
movements. The question posed is: “Which story can the government tell to encourage
the decline of radical groups and the disengagement of their members?” The article
makes use of the survey of factors promoting decline and disengagement drawn up by
Demant, Slootman, Buijs (†) and Tillie in 2008, as well as the factor “official policy
strategies” based on concepts taken from discourse analysis, adapted to counterterror-
ism and deradicalization strategies by De Graaf in 2009. The article will therefore not
address the different practical measures in this field, but focus instead on the perception
of these official measures by the radicals. It will illustrate this with two case studies: the
deradicalization of South Moluccan youths in the 1970s and of jihadist radicals after
2001, both in the Netherlands.
Terrorists want theater and are bent on provoking state power. The impact of their actions
depends on the reaction.1 This reaction is partly produced by public opinion, the media,
and the gripping images of dramatic terrorist attacks that are disseminated by the latter.
Government can, however, also influence this impact,2 both in a reinforcing sense, by
amplifying the “moral panic” in society through the use of military metaphors (“we are at
war”) or in a counteracting sense, by underlining and appealing to the social resilience of
a society. The actions of British Prime Minister Tony Blair immediately after the London
bombings of 7 July 2005: “Terror will not win, we will not be intimidated” are an example
of the second approach.3 In addition to managing the terrorist impact, governments can
also influence the terrorists, their sympathizers and constituencies directly, through the
performance of its activities.
Terrorists know this even better than the governments themselves do. Significantly, in
advance of American President Barack Obama’s visit to Egypt, Osama bin Laden warned
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the Arabic world via Al-Jazeera that the United States was still demonizing Muslims. With
this message, Al Qaeda’s leader tried to neutralize the—from his perspective—threatening
effects of the historical dialogue and cooperation that Obama offered the “Muslim World.”4
After all, with his offer the American president undermined the jihadists’ efforts to mobilize
their constituency. Bin Laden knows very well that the jihadists need stories of injustice
and repression to convince themselves and others of the legitimacy of the battle and to keep
their supporters motivated and loyal.
Radicalization is not an irreversible process. A radical movement can fall apart, peter
out, or transform itself into a non-radical movement: in other words, it can deradicalize.
Governments can contribute to this “conversion” by being aware of the injustice stories
disseminated and by confronting these narratives with better, or neutralizing stories.5 But
how does this process work?
To answer this question, the article first offers a short summary of the survey into
deradicalization from a collective perspective that Demant et al. carried out.6 Second, it gives
an outline of the role government performance plays in this process, based on de Graaf’s
research.7 Third are presented two case studies, based on historical and field research (see
later in the article for the methodology and sources involved). Two chronologically distinct
case studies were used: the history of Moluccan (de-)radicalization in the Netherlands in the
1970s and the process of Islamic (de-)radicalization after 2001, also in the Netherlands. In
presenting these case descriptions, attention is given to both the development of radicalism
and violence and to the relationship between government policy and the (de-)radicalization
process. Last, the two cases are compared, and some conclusions are drawn.
Deradicalization of Radical Movements
Government is, of course, not the only factor influencing processes of deradicalization.
Demant et al. maintain that to understand the decline and dissolution of radical groupings,
emphasis should be put on the interaction between radicals and their organization or
movement.8 This interaction can be perceived in terms of demand and supply. In a given
society, a considerable number of disgruntled citizens can strive for radical changes. This
“demand” for action can remain latent if it does not find an appropriate “supply” of radical
repertoires. Conversely, this supply of initiatives for radical change will remain untouched if
there are no disenfranchised citizens. When demand and supply meet, a radical movement
will blossom. Should the interaction between demand and supply become unbalanced,
however, the movement will decline or even disappear.
On the “supply side” (the radical movement) one can identify several factors that
can cause a movement to become disconnected from the demands. The ideology of the
movement can lose its appeal, either because the radical perspective on the existing order
is no longer attractive or because the movement’s vision for the future no longer mobilizes
the constituency. The ideology can also lose its persuasive power because its adherents are
no longer convinced of their strategy and method. In addition, the movement can fail on an
organizational level. This could be induced by a weak leadership that no longer inspires or
leads or is not flexible enough to react to changing circumstances.
On the “demand side” (the sympathizers and potential members of a movement)
changes can also occur that infringe on the radical movement’s vigor. An important factor
on this level is the absence of new recruits. Sometimes, a movement that once captivated
a certain generation, lacks appeal for the next one. If the movement fails to adapt to the
wishes of the new generation, it will (eventually) decline.
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This interplay between demand and supply does not take place in a vacuum. Social
movements are located in a context that provides them with changing opportunities and re-
strictions that influence the movement’s dynamics. Movements can be curtailed or amplified
by external factors that influence their tactics, actions, and decisions. These external factors
can be political, cultural, social, or economic in nature. How within a certain movement
members react to these opportunities and restrictions depends on how they perceive and
interpret them. One contextual factor might be a local or international conflict that radicals
identify with. The way such a conflict develops has a bearing on the movement. Another
contextual factor is the presence of other—probably radical—competing organizations.
One specific contextual factor needs to be addressed here, e.g., the actions of the
government. A government can react in many different ways to radical organizations and
movements and can influence the demand as well as the supply side of these movements. To
analyze this influence, this article will further develop the analytical framework of Demant
et al. by employing three concepts derived from discourse analysis: the role of signifiers,
legends, and neutralizers, as these have been adapted by de Graaf.9 Focusing on the role of
the government means that the other factors that can play a role in the decline of a radical
movement (such as supply, demand, or external factors) remain unattended. This choice is
justified by the fact that in many studies on deradicalization or disengagement the role of
government performance has been underexposed because the focus has been on the radical
groups and individuals themselves.10
The Role of Government Performance in the Deradicalization Process
How can a government influence radical groups? The considerations set out earlier bring
one to the proposition that it is not only the type of policy instrument that matters, but
also the message of that instrument that comes across to the extremists and terrorists.
Infiltration operations, arrests, and convictions do matter, but at the same time, concrete
policy instruments can send a message that only weakly supports or even undermines
these policies. For example, by arresting one radical, the authorities might in the short run
remove one person from the radical scene, but this intervention may serve to radicalize three
others in the longer run. Therefore, this article emphasizes the message—the presentation
of government policies through public and political discourse—and its perception by the
radicals, since these are the elements that matter most in liberal democracies.11
This insight immediately exposes a fundamental problem of government policy in the
area of deradicalization: the coordination and coherence of the various initiatives. Police
services, intelligence and security services, local councils, and so on operate independently
of each other and view radical movements in totally different perspectives. The different
bodies can support each other, but they can also be in complete disagreement. What
is crucially important, however, is which of these agencies determines the image that is
projected by the media and becomes entrenched among the radicals’ grass-roots supporters.
The process is not straightforward. The government is not the only “sender” of those
images, and the radicals are not solely the passive “receivers.” Activities, carried out by
persons or organs that are counted as being part of “the government” can be deliberately
and adversely portrayed by so-called entrepreneurs of violence,12 who can amplify and
exaggerate government actions from the outset as illegitimate, unjust, or hostile.13
This process has been defined by Della Porta as the “framing” of “injustice.”14 De
Graaf has elaborated on this process in her study on counterterrorism in the 1970s.15
Certain governmental actions function as “signifier”16 : participants in a radical movement
and their sympathizers give meaning to such an incident, fitting it into their ideological
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frame of reference. Examples of such incidents are the proclamation of new laws, official
statements, or actions by the police or security forces. A well-known historical example
is the death of the German student Benno Ohnesorg who was shot on 2 June 1967 by
police officer Karl Heinz Kurras during a demonstration against the visit of the shah of
Iran to West Berlin. Ohnesorg’s death became a symbolic “signifier” and rallying point
for the leftist student movement in Germany, especially for its radical and violent fringe.17
Militant students linked to this significant instance the “legend” or narrative that a police
state was about to emerge in Germany again and that it had already started eradicating all
opposition.18 The terrorist grouping “The 2nd of June Movement” (affiliated to the Red
Army Faction) even took its name from this incident.19
With such “signifiers,” legends and injustice frames are developed that are projected
and disseminated by the radical groups.20 Partly, these legends are based on facts (Ohnesorg
really died). However, the terrorists and their following blow up these facts, transforming
an incident into the harbinger of a new police state. The construction of such legends
fortifies the ideological foundation of the radical movement. In this sense, the government
can unwittingly contribute to further radicalization.
For a process of deradicalization to set in, those radical legends should be prevented or
moulded into a less or non-radical story. Here, so-called neutralizers enter the picture, for
example, governmental actions that counteract or undermine existing legends and serve to
neutralize the injustice frames that legitimize radical ideology. They could include public
apologies for police excesses as described earlier, sanctioning of the police officers involved
in those excesses, dialogue sessions with the radicals’ constituencies, or other statements by
government representatives, aimed at neutralizing a politicized and polarized atmosphere.
Through the use of such “neutralizers” legends can be attenuated, reducing a radical
ideology’s persuasive power for its adherents (thereby infringing on the supply side of the
radical movement) and a movement’s appeal to sympathizers and new generations can be
counteracted (thereby diminishing the demand side).
It is important to note the influence that government and governmental bodies exert
with their counterterrorism policy—and specifically the presentation of that policy—on the
targets of that policy: the demand and supply side of the radical movement. To this purpose,
the article now examines two cases studies of government action against terrorism and
radicalization, focusing on how that policy was perceived by the radicals and the relationship
of this policy to deradicalization. The first is the case of young South-Moluccans in the
Netherlands in the 1970s and then the next section considers current Islamic radicalism,
also in the Netherlands.
Methodology and Sources
The two cases will be described and compared cross-historically as well as theoretically,
using the concepts of demand and supply, signifiers, legends, and neutralizers outlined
earlier. It could be argued, at first sight, that these two cases differ too significantly to yield
relevant comparisons. The Moluccan actions might be viewed as isolated instances of ethnic
campaigning for compatriots abroad, whereas Islamic extremists not only indiscriminately
threatened the whole of Dutch society but also questioned the political system as such.
These differences could offer a rather straightforward explanation for the public’s and
government’s dramatic response to the latter type of terrorism as compared to the relatively
modest reaction to the Moluccan actions in the 1970s. However, such an explanation is
insufficient. To dismiss our argument by pointing to the graver danger Islamic terrorism
presents nowadays ignores and marginalizes the terrorist threat of the past.
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First of all, it is easily forgotten that the Moluccans were among the first terrorists in
the West to take innocent civilians hostage and to hit soft targets like public transportation
(they hijacked two passenger trains) or a whole primary school. The Moluccans furthermore
killed some of their hostages to reinforce their demands. Their actions gained worldwide
media attention and chained Dutch citizens to their televisions for several weeks. The
railway tracks between Zwolle and Assen became notorious, people were terrified to be in
the same train or bus with Moluccan youngsters, and Moluccan neighbourhoods became
theaters for violent clashes between police, Moluccans, and indigenous Dutch citizens. In
contrast to the number of incidents, casualties, and deaths involved in the Moluccan case,
Dutch publicist Theo van Gogh (murdered by Islamic terrorist Mohammed Bouyeri on
2 November 2004) has so far been the only fatality attributable to Islamic actions in the
Netherlands.
It is therefore not instantaneously logical that public reactions to this latter type of ter-
rorism would become so much more dramatic than in the Moluccan case, especially if one
considers the public climate vis-à-vis terrorism in the 1970s in neighboring Germany. Up un-
til 1975, the number of casualties there was about the same as in the Netherlands—although
Germany’s population was almost five times larger. However, public outrage and moral
panic in Germany immediately soared high in 1970, a phenomenon that cannot be ex-
plained away by pointing to the different type of terrorism: ethnic in the Netherlands versus
revolutionary in Germany. This labelling should be rather viewed as a projection in ret-
rospect than as a difference experienced at the time. In the Netherlands, the Moluccan
actions occurred in the midst of a broader wave of terrorist incidents. The revolutionary
Red Youth started their bombing campaign in 1970, and no one knew that they would not
live up to their threats of also targeting human lives. Palestinian mujahedeen carried out
bombing activities in 1971, 1972, and 1974 (not resulting in any deaths, but then again,
that could not be predicted). The Moluccans, who dressed up in Black Power gear and used
anti-imperialist rhetoric and symbols, did not seem to differ that much from these other
anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, and revolutionary actions. Therefore, it remains a topic
for further research rather than a truism that Dutch public reaction to the Moluccan attacks
remained so calm, and no terrorist scare developed, as it did in Germany in the 1970s or in
the Netherlands itself after 2001.
The interest of comparing Moluccan and Islamic radicalism lies thus in this difference
of public outrage and governmental reactions, whereas the radical subjects involved display
some similarities: the radicals in both cases belonged to a second generation of immigrants,
were members of an ethnic minority, and felt excluded from Dutch society. They legitimized
their radicalism through solidarity with and frustration over the fate of their compatriots at
home and abroad—while the Moluccans identified compatriotism through kinship, in the
Islamic case, religion of course played a crucial role. But even in this latter case, Islamic
radicals in the Netherlands were characterized by the same ethnic background (either by
birth or as second- generation immigrants): Moroccan, or from other Maghreb countries—a
fact too easily overlooked with a focus solely on religion.21
The case studies are furthermore based on a literature study and on several sources
that draw from existing publications and ongoing research projects. The quotations of
Moluccan and Islamic radicals are taken from the aforementioned study of Demant et al.
and the study “Strijders van eigen bodem” [Home grown warriors] by Buijs, Demant, and
Hamdy (in Dutch).22 In addition to these sources, the authors made use of the historical
research de Graaf conducted on the decision-making process, discourse, representation,
and perception of governmental strategies against terrorism and political violence.23 She
consulted police, judicial, intelligence, and other political archives, and also interviewed
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a few former Moluccan radicals.24 Although some secondary literature on the Moluccan
movement exists, the development of an official government strategy has not been explored
in a structural sense.25
The sources used here do not offer a quantitative representation of the radicals involved.
The projects did not aim to produce such results. These documents and interviews do, how-
ever, offer insights in individual processes and patterns of deradicalization. It is important
to underline that the interpretation and meaning the radicals gave to governmental actions
are of central concern in this article, and thus in-depth interviews, newspaper clippings,
court files or transcripts, and police reports offer highly relevant insights.
The quotations used here all stem from South Moluccan youths who played an active
part in the radical movement and/or the violent terrorist actions of the 1970s. For the Islamic
respondents, this radical involvement can be less clearly described. First, because no clear-
cut radical Islamic movement exists in the Netherlands comparable to that of the South
Moluccan youths. Second, there have been few violent incidents in the Netherlands since
2004. Therefore, the Islamic radicals interviewed have been selected because they have
declared themselves to have been part of a radical ideological faction. Nevertheless, their
remarks also provide interesting insights into the perception of radical activists of govern-
mental actions and into the manner such actions can influence deradicalization processes.
Case Study: The South Moluccan Radicals
Moluccan Terrorism in the Netherlands in the 1970s
From 1966 on, South Moluccan youths tried by means of political activities, demonstrations,
and Molotov Cocktails to draw attention to the situation of the Moluccan minority in the
Netherlands. Their parents, who had served in the Dutch colonial army, had come to
the Netherlands in 1950 after the independence of Indonesia. There, the roughly 12,500
Moluccan soldiers were demobilized and together with their families accommodated in
camps. While the older generation still fostered the hope that they would one day be able
to return to their native region in the Spice Islands, the radical movement of the younger
generation wanted to demonstrate to the Dutch and Indonesian governments, by means of
violence, their responsibility for the loss of the Moluccans’ homeland.
During the summer of 1970, it was announced that Indonesian President Suharto would
visit the Netherlands. For the South Moluccan youths, this rapprochement between the two
countries constituted a direct political insult and served as a “signifier” for political action.
They used the visit to publicly demonstrate their mounting feelings of indignation about
the Dutch indifference to their plight. On 31 August 1970, the day before Suharto’s state
visit, 33 young men invaded the residence of the Indonesian Ambassador and took all those
present hostage. After one day, the Moluccans gave themselves up. During the attack they
shot the senior Hague police officer Hans Moolenaar, who was patrolling the residence in
Wassenaar.26 In 1975 the South Moluccans went a step further and hijacked a train (and
in the process executed three passengers). They also occupied the Indonesian consulate. In
1977 they repeated the train hijacking, this time also occupying a primary school, taking
more than a hundred schoolchildren hostage. In 1975 the Moluccans could still be talked
out of the train, but by the time of the last action the government sent in new antiterrorist
units. Six of the nine hijackers and two passengers lost their lives during this action to free
the train. The final event of this series of terrorist actions by Moluccan youths took place
in 1978: the occupation of the Provinciehuis in Assen, which ended with two deaths.27
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Government Policy
Remarkably enough, no Dutch counterterrorism policy existed before 1973, although a
series of violent political incidents and attacks had taken place in the immediately preceding
years. Only after the Munich tragedy in Germany, on 6 September 1972, did the preparations
for setting up an antiterrorism force reach an operational level and a steering group was
formed at the interdepartmental level of government. In January 1973 the Biesheuvel
government presented to the Chamber an extensive packet of antiterrorism measures, the
so-called Terreurbrief [“Terror brief”]. This brief was not only a reaction to the Moluccan
actions, but also to the bombings by the Rode Jeugd—“Red Youth,” a Dutch left extremist
group—and several Palestinian attacks.28
The brief expressed a pragmatic approach, and its tone was rather practical. No words
were directed to the ideological or political motivations of the alleged terrorists. What
was deemed necessary was to find efficient measures to combat new offenses, such as
incitements, arson attacks, and sabotage. The perpetrators (the South Moluccan youths, the
Red Youth, and Palestine groups) were mentioned briefly, but not specified in more detail,
let alone “demonized” or framed as real enemies. To be sure, the brief spoke of “acts of
terror,” meaning actions “where serious interests, especially human lives are threatened
immediately.”29 No new legal measures were, however, adopted and the population was
not mobilized against this new threat.30
This rather smooth and tacit policy solution to the new wave of terrorist attacks
was only made possible because “terrorism” did not present a major threat to the pub-
lic opinion. The various incidents, which after all cost the lives of 11 people between
1970 and 1977, were not inflated into one single, homogeneous threat. Public–political
discourse regarding terrorism remained low-key and fragmented. The threat remained
limited and containable; there was no “moral panic.” No enemy image of “Moluccan
terrorists” was constructed. The Moluccans were to be found in isolated barracks or res-
idential areas and mostly kept aloof from Dutch society. They were considered “for-
eign” and “exotic.” They were nevertheless also seen as a left-over from the Dutch colo-
nial past. To the conservative majority of the Netherlands, the Moluccans were “our”
loyal, royalist, and mainly Protestant allies, while to the left and liberal segments of
the Dutch population they were “our” colonial burden and the Netherlands owed them
something.31
In spite of this “benign neglect” a series of official statements and measures (“signi-
fiers”) fed the discontent among South Moluccan youths. In the first place, the government’s
promise after the first action in 1970—that they would hold talks with the RMS (the self-
proclaimed South Moluccan Republic) government—created bad blood when nothing much
came of it. Second, the crude and rather brutal behavior of the military police in clearing
the Moluccan camps and during their house searches in, for example, Capelle aan de IJssel
and Bovensmilde, generated considerable anger.32 Third, the repeated remarks of Dutch
politicians over the pointlessness of the continuing RMS-question did not go down well.
The November 1975 address by Queen Juliana, in which she declared that the people of
Suriname had the right to self-determination, also fueled the indignation of the Moluccans,
who felt they had been slighted.33
These “signifiers” fed into the “injustice frame” or legend that the Dutch government
left the Moluccan minority in the cold, ignored their struggle for independence, and gave
them false promises. This sense of indignation over the perceived Dutch indifference went
deep, and in interviews with former radical South Moluccans held in 2008 this theme recurs
constantly:
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Respondent 134 : In 1975, further attention was again paid to the RMS: it once
again came to the fore to a greater extent. During the preceding years, Dutch
politicians often declared: “The RMS is dead.” “That is a dream.” We wanted
to step up the struggle once again, in order to demand attention from both
the Netherlands and the rest of the world for our independence. The political
context hadn’t changed, but we were being over-looked. They said: “Just let
the Moluccans dream.” They made a real error by calling it a dream, and the
radicalisation increased during this period. It would definitely have made a
difference if they had listened. We had already been working on petitions, etc.
for a number of years, and the older generation still did that. But the young
people mainly had the feeling of “This is the limit!” If only they had listened to
us or had taken us seriously, that would have taken away a great deal of the fuss
and unrest. But instead, these feelings were actually fuelled by statements such
as “What they want is irrational, a dream.” We always responded to statements
by politicians, either Dutch or Indonesian. And up to 1969, we continually
renounced violence.’
Government Policy and Deradicalization
Only after the second train hijacking was there a clear ideological reversal, which played an
important role in the deradicalization, as is apparent from a number of the interviews with
the Moluccans. It strikes one that it was not so much the social and integrative activities
undertaken by government that impressed the radical Moluccans—on the contrary, those
initiatives were often rejected as “sweet-talk” or appeasement initiatives35 —but rather the
violence with which the hijackings were ended, both the violence of the hijackers and the
ruthless ending of the hijacking in 1977. Such an escalation had not been anticipated. The
Moluccans’ ideals were not attainable through violence,36 or to put it more forcefully, the
violence inflicted damage on their own population:
Respondent 137 : You think that you can get anything you want with a gun.
Well, you definitely can’t. And then you might get really angry . . . but if that
doesn’t get you anywhere. . . . Then we stopped. . . . Then everyone in the train
suddenly understood: if we gun everyone down . . . that doesn’t work. So we
stopped. We changed our strategy.
Respondent 438 : And taking Van Agt hostage, so that was earlier. During that
time, I realised: violent actions in the Netherlands do not work. . . . De Punt
was the turning point for me. At that time, I didn’t just see that violence doesn’t
pay. I also saw that violence means there is a structurally hostile relationship
between the Moluccans and Dutch.
Respondent 539 : [But when did you get out of the game?] When. . .? In ’77. It
was then I thought to myself: no more of that. We can’t have that anymore. We
can’t be butchered like that anymore.
Only after the brutal termination of the 1977 hijacking did the Moluccan activists start to
doubt the attainability of their objectives, especially the possibility of relieving the plight of
their population through violence.40 The grounds for this conversion lay in the number of
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casualties within their own ranks, the realization that they could not win by military means,
and in the fact that their Moluccan constituency started to turn away from this course of
action and signalled that it had had enough. Only then, when the tacit and covert support
of relatives, friends and leaders for violent actions declined, did a window of opportunity
for the neutralizing measures and integrative efforts the government had initiated in 1976
open up.
These “neutralizers” that undermined the radical ideology of the RMS-ideal and re-
inforced the shift in objectives were provided by two new commissions, created by the
government in 1976. After years of negotiation, in February 1976 the first committee (the
Committee for Moluccan Participation and Welfare) was established under the auspices of
the Department for Culture, Recreation and Social Work, and endorsed by the Moluccan
political party, the Badan Persatuan. In May 1976, under the authority of the Department
of Justice, the second commission, the committee-Köbben-Mantouw was established. The
first commission addressed issues of social welfare, the second (which consisted of Moluc-
can and Dutch representatives, jointly chaired by Dutch professor of sociology André
Köbben and Moluccan representative Loulou Mantouw) aimed at solving political aspects
of the Moluccan question. Both committees initiated numerous new activities that offered
Moluccan youths other venues to engage themselves in the Moluccan cause rather than
resort to violence: they organized housing support, help for drug addicts, traineeships for
Moluccan students, support for Moluccan war victims, and arranged for Moluccan radio
and television broadcasting time.41
Another important “neutralizer” was created with the organization of “homeland visits”
for “key leaders” and other informal representatives of the Moluccan minority. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs arranged with the Indonesian government that the South Moluccans could
visit and meet compatriots in Indonesia. Many of them returned from these visits with the
(correct) impression that on the Moluccan isles and among their kinsmen abroad the idea
of independence had long ceased to attract much interest.
Through the combination of the violent repression of the hijackings in 1977 and the
simultaneous offer of new possibilities for engagement and integration, the shift in objec-
tives became consolidated. Consequently, many Moluccans concluded that the struggle for
justice and self-determination should be transferred from the Dutch arena to the Moluccan
territory. Not in the sense that they wanted to attempt another guerrilla war against the
Indonesian government (although some Dutch Moluccans still expected a military invasion
to be launched in the Moluccas some day), but in the sense of supporting the Moluccan
minority in Indonesia in their political battle for recognition and more liberties. In any case,
the Netherlands for them no longer was the envisaged theater for violent actions. Many
Moluccans decided to contribute in other ways to the relieving of the plight of their people:
they became active in development initiatives or in the care and treatment of drug addicts:
Respondent 242 : It became diluted. [But how?] I came to realise that a separate
republic was not feasible. And then we began to do development work. . . .
Then we began to adopt the approach that was the least negative: attempting to
develop the islands. We began to help the population. So, it was not a Republic,
but the effort did create houses, water pipes and education. A great deal of
financial support was given by the Moluccans here. So we shifted our focus
from a political ideal to building up Moluccan society in Indonesia. . . . I saw
that it was not feasible! But I wanted justice. I focused upon that, and then I
began to do development work. There was a shift in my ideal.
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This shift of objectives and ideals made it possible for the Moluccans to begin to see
themselves as a part of Dutch society and the Dutch political system; a mental shift that
brought a halt to their violent actions:
Respondent 443 : Only years later did I renounce violence as a means. That is
because you have taken over part of Dutch society. You have become a part
of it. . . . If you are a part of society, only then can you renounce violence.
Nevertheless, you wish to contribute towards society. You have a place in
society, you have chosen this society, and then you have to find other ways
of realising your love for your country. . . . Not only did I realise that violence
doesn’t pay, but I also realised that violence means that a fundamentally hostile
attitude exists between the Moluccans and the Dutch. And that this stands in
the way of you being accepted. And you begin to love this country anyway.
Case Study: Islamic Radicals
Terrorism in the Netherlands after 2001
The attack on the Twin Towers marked a new era in the Netherlands as well, that of the
“War on Terror.” Although the Netherlands faced jihadist terrorism on its own soil only
with the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004, there were some incidents of
young Muslims who wanted to go the aid of their co-religionists in Chechnya before that
date.44 After 2004, when the new law on Terrorist Crimes was adopted, several radical
Muslims were brought before the courts on charges of preparing terrorist actions.45
The current Dutch counterterrorism policy, as developed since the late 1990s, and
particularly since 2001, is characterized by its international background and the radical
emphasis on criminal prosecution.46 These two characteristics are closely linked. In con-
tradistinction to the 1970s when countering terrorism was a purely Dutch affair (with at
most a single voice of encouragement or impulse from abroad), the new legislation issued
from the European decisions and UN resolutions against Al Qaeda and international ji-
hadist terrorism. As a consequence of the European framework decision, the Netherlands
introduced a law in 2004 that made terrorist acts and all associated activities aimed at
the recruitment, conspiracy, or preparation to commit such acts, and the participation in
terrorist organizations punishable offenses.47
Therefore, only since 2004 has there been a specifically counterterrorist judicial policy,
a policy that focused on the punitive consequences of terrorism in all stages of its prepa-
ration, conspiracy, and execution. In addition, administrative measures—for example, in
the areas of fiscal or alien legal rights or with relation to provision of subsidies—aimed at
curtailing the breeding grounds for terrorism were introduced.48 Moreover, far more than in
1970, the bodies charged with combating terrorism were qualitatively reformed, expanded
and reorganized. Between 2004 and 2007 the AIVD (the Dutch General Intelligence and
Security Service) tripled its personnel; the police forces developed their own antiterrorist
capacities, while the BBEs (special support units of the Marines) were combined with
DSI (Special Intervention Service) units of the KLPD. In 2004 a central post was cre-
ated to improve cooperation between these agencies (e.g., the National Coordinator for
counterterrorism, whose responsibility was to oversee the whole system of surveillance
and security). In short, terrorism crisis management became a central element of the Dutch
security policy.
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Unlike in the 1970s, the new counterterrorism strategy after 2001 was characterized by
a discourse of public mobilization and a hard and robust tone.49 “We are at war” according to
Minister Zalm.50 Major political parties raised the question of counterterrorism to the point
of a political contest. The parties of the right were all vying to outdo each other; no-one
wanted to be accused of being “soft on terrorism.” At the same time, in the political and
parliamentary discussions, counterterrorist policy was constantly linked to deeper-seated
fears and social problems, such as the problem of integration, the “multicultural drama,”
the rise of fundamentalism and the question of the separation of church and state.51
This made the whole issue of terrorism and radicalization an extraordinarily complex
and at the same time infectious problem. The associations were played on everywhere and
long afterwards remained stuck to the idea of terrorism in the public mind. Fear dominated
the public debate until far into the year 2007. “Moroccan hangjongeren” (a derogatory term
applied to youths who habitually hang around urban spaces, with or without evil intent) at
a stroke became “Muslim youths” or even “Islamic street terrorists.”52
This phenomenon did not escape the (radicalizing) Islamic youths. From in-depth
interviews with radicalized Muslim youths carried out in 2005, it emerged that such public
and political derogatory statements (“signifiers”) led them to feel themselves to be the
“underdog”:
Respondent 653 : Muslims in the Netherlands and throughout the world are
victims, and that’s all there is to it. Before the witch-hunt of recent times, I
never thought that the West had it in for Muslims, but this has become clearer
and clearer to me. On radio 1 and 2, I hear journalists and politicians talking
about a war against Islam. A premeditated war. In addition, Muslims are all
lumped together in the Dutch media.
The respondents in these interviews declared that they felt that, as Muslims, they were
continually being called to account and never fully accepted:
Respondent 854 : I can really see a toughening of attitudes in the Netherlands.
When I get on a train or bus, people look at me strangely. Or if you’re on an
escalator, they grab hold of their bags. That’s the problem of generalisation as
I see it. Muslim, Moroccan, it’s six of one and half a dozen of the other. But
not all people are the same, and still we all get lumped together. At the end of
the day, it doesn’t make you feel that you’re at home. You’re a Moroccan and
a Muslim and that’s the way you’ll stay.
This sense of alienation and exclusion was reinforced by a series of arrests of terror-
ism suspects after 2001. The liberal newspaper NRC Handelsblad reported in June 2009
that since 2004 113 terrorism suspects had been apprehended, of whom only 27 were
convicted—all other arrests could not be substantiated. This produced a considerable num-
ber of “signifiers.”55
Nonetheless, from 2006 onward, the focus of official counterterrorism efforts fell
increasingly on deradicalization, with “repressive” counterterrorism taking more of a back
seat. In 2007 the Amsterdam municipal council presented an extensive plan of action to
combat radicalization.56 Elsewhere in the country too, local governments were undertaking
initiatives aimed at combating radicalization.57 Thus, in close cooperation with moderate
Islamic organizations, an offer of alternative ways of thinking was developed, knowledge
of democracy was promoted within the Islamic community, and it was made more difficult
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to disseminate radical ideology. The aim behind all such measures was to enhance the
social willingness and ability to fight back, especially within the Islamic section of the
population.58
Partly because of these initiatives, but also because other crises (financial, for example)
surfaced, the pendulum in the public and political discourse on combating terrorism swung
back a little.59 Queen Beatrix’s Christmas address to the nation in 2007, for example,
took an unmistakable position against polarization. Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende
accused right-wing politician Geert Wilders, known for his call for retribution and for harsh
measures against radical Muslims and terror suspects, of “un-Dutch behavior.” In January
2008 the Court of Justice definitively acquitted five of the seven members of the Hofstad
group.
Not only did the government show itself to be more resilient, large sections of the
population also showed themselves capable of standing their ground and were unwilling to
allow themselves to be dictated by fear anymore. In general, it seemed that polarization and
extremism had succumbed to a kind of weariness. Moreover, there was growing attention to
another issue: the neglected protection of privacy.60 The reaction of the “terrorism suspects”
arrested on 12 March 2009 on anonymous accusations of preparing terrorist acts, directed
against an Ikea store in Amsterdam, as well as the public indignation of the government’s
harsh and premature evacuation of the area, illustrated this tendency.61
Government Policy and Deradicalization
In summer 2009, it was still unclear how far one can talk of the deradicalization of
Islamic radicals. The AIVD recently claimed that the strength of the jihadist movement has
declined, which in turn meant a lessening of the acute threat to the Netherlands. According
to the AIVD, this resulted partly from effective counterterrorism measures and partly from
internal developments within the movement.62 The measures undertaken since 2004 in the
fight against jihadist terrorism had a considerable disruptive effect on the known networks
and cells, according to the intelligence service, and the terrorist threat therefore seemed “less
acute.”63 One of these steps was the criminal prosecution and expulsion of suspects from
the Netherlands. Various suspects have been sentenced, some for murder or for possession
of weapons, but also for the preparation of a terrorist attack.64
However, in spite of these positive trends, the two most important policy areas in
this context—combating terrorism and deradicalization—were still not always in line with
each other. For example, counterterrorism measures—such as “administrative measures”
that allow local mayors to impose on individuals a ban on entering an area or approaching
a person, or an order to report regularly to authorities65 —could once again dispel the
goodwill developed among Islamic groups and contribute to new injustice frames again.66
One of the interviews conducted in 2008 with deradicalized Muslims shows indirectly
how a negative discourse and perceived incidents of injustice can encourage the turning
away of Muslim youths from society. The respondent describes how the space for and
understanding of her own quest for self-determination and her adolescent attitude of protest
ensured that she did not further radicalize. She thinks that an atmosphere of misunder-
standing and negative attention simply enhances the process by which youths become even
further alienated and frustrated:
Respondent 1667 : But at school they weren’t startled by my head scarf at the
time either; they thought, just let her discover her identity. That wouldn’t be
possible now. Nowadays I really would have been radicalised. The debate is
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carried on much differently. Much more overbearing. . . . We were very pious,
but were never really very radical. Nowadays, I would have been radicalised;
it’s often counter-conduct. I did not radicalise because there was the room and
the understanding to go through that evolution. That room isn’t there now; all
that fuss about head scarves. A lot of girls are starting to wear a head scarf now
as a way of rebelling. I would have done that too.
Moreover, with these respondents, the contact with significant others emerges as an
important circumstance of deradicalization. These others could be individuals—like a new
imam, fellow believers, or family members—who were respected by the respondent and
who engaged him or her in a debate over his or her ideology. Because the respondent saw
them as a legitimate interlocutor, they had the opportunity to introduce him or her to a new
way of thinking, thereby “neutralizing” many of their old “injustice frames”:
Respondent 1768 : But the imams did ultimately clarify it for me and helped
in my return . . . especially the imam from the neighbourhood mosque . . . that
was a new imam from Morocco. He knew about everything that was going on
in Morocco, and he was very liberal and was well informed of everything. He
kept an open view, had a lot of knowledge about Islam and was able to convey
that well. I was able to master Arabic really fast. . . . It was my own attitude: I
was searching. And I was able to speak Moroccan Arabic with him, my own
dialect. He didn’t come across like a holy man. You could really talk to him.
This insight could be valuable in any official deradicalization program for Islamic
radicals.69 It is significant in this context, however, to bear in mind that this finding con-
cerns a policy aimed at individuals, and not at the radical movement as a whole. With
deradicalization or exit programs the decline of a radical movement can only be indirectly
influenced, by “stealing away” members from that organization. No influence is exerted on
radical ideology, its legends, nor on persons that are susceptible to Islamic radicalism or
are already involved in a process of radicalization.
A Comparison of the Two Case Studies
We will now compare the case studies with each other. As accentuated earlier, the two cases
bear similarities, but also differ to a great extent. The Moluccan case is more historical,
the Islamic one belongs to the present, with an open ending. The cases also differ in terms
of the international embeddedness of the conflict and the ideology and religion at stake.
Because of these differences the article does not claim to make any definite statements on the
comparable influence of government strategies on deradicalization, but some expectations
can be expressed, based on the Moluccan case, about the possible role of government
interventions in reducing Islamic radicalism.
In the history of Moluccan radical violence, a number of governmental actions have
been identified that functioned as “signifiers” for (supposed) repression and neglect. These
included the announcement of Suharto’s state visit to the Netherlands, the unfinished talks
between the RMS-government in exile and the Dutch prime minister, remarks made by
Dutch politicians about the pointlessness of the RMS-ideal and the address of Queen
Juliana on the independence of Surinam in November 1975. These incidents inspired and
reinforced legends of injustices done to the Moluccans by the Dutch government and
population.
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Only after the government brutally terminated the 1977 hijacking did the time come to
“bend” these injustice frames in a more positive direction. The “neutralizers” that succeeded
in doing this were the various initiatives undertaken by the two official commissions, aimed
at promoting Moluccan welfare, integration, and political participation, as well as the
“homeland trips.” These neutralizers had a twofold impact. On the supply side of the radical
movement (the members) they undermined the influence of the radical ideology (“even with
violence, we cannot achieve our goals, other methods have become available”), they made
the RMS-ideal seem less realistic (their fellow Moluccans in Indonesia appeared not to
share their ideal anymore) and other, alternative objectives emerged (solving the Moluccan
question through development aid). On the demand side (possible new generations of
radicals and their sympathizers) the ideal of armed struggle lost appeal and became less
compelling and dominant. The younger generations became more oriented toward their
host society and became less isolated.
For the Islamic radicals, the process of (de-)radicalization has a much more interna-
tional and global character. The legend that Muslims worldwide are oppressed by their
Western enemies is being disseminated and illustrated with gripping images through inter-
national television and Internet channels on a daily basis. Conflicts in Iraq, Israel–Palestine,
and Afghanistan produce almost incalculable “signifiers,” thereby inspiring frames of ref-
erence in which the relation between “Muslims” and “the West” is interpreted as an almost
eschatological conflict. Within the Dutch context, official statements or positions (such
as the remarks by minister Zalm or the refusal by Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen in
December 2008 to condemn the Gaza bombings70 ) acted as “signifiers,” reinforcing the
legend of the oppressive and hypocritical West, including Dutch society and government.
The same applied to the arrests of terrorism suspects and other discriminatory incidents
after 2001.
From 2006 onward, many attempts have been made, however, to work together with
the Muslim communities in countering radicalization. These attempts can be seen as
first steps in neutralizing legends of injustice and oppression. A successful example in
this context was the neutralizing effect that efforts of Dutch Muslim organizations and
government representatives had, when in early 2008 they jointly succeeded in breaking
the wave of indignation caused by Fitna, the film produced by opposition leader Geert
Wilders.71
To undermine “injustice frames” as organization resources for radical movements and
to advance their decline in this manner, for example, through initiatives of cooperation,
public diplomacy, and communication, it is certainly necessary for the various civil and
official institutions to act in concord or draw a similar line. Counterterrorism strategies
should not unreflectively impinge on deradicalization initiatives, as was the case with the
“Ikea affair” in March 2009.72
What lines can thus be drawn between these two cases? In the first place, in both
cases the authors identified significant moments that became connected to certain legends
of injustice and oppression. With the Moluccan youths, this injustice was, however, much
more concrete and described much more articulately than with the Islamic radicals. The
South Moluccans had a concrete, geographically and politically demarcated grief. They lost
their homeland, were stateless, and lived in barracks (sometimes even former labor camps,
used by the German occupiers before 1945, were used as dwellings). The “signifiers” that
enhanced their sense of injustice were accordingly concrete and predictable.
The “signifiers” influencing the Islamic radicals are much more diverse and unpre-
dictable, and the corresponding legends much more abstract and universal. “Signifiers” can
be made out of terrorist arrests, but also of political statements about Moroccan youths, or
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based on incidents of discrimination on the shop floor. Moreover, these “signifiers” are not
contained in time or space. They occur within the Dutch public space, but also in Gaza or
Iraq. The lack of temporal or spatial boundaries renders it much more difficult to anticipate
them, to identify them in a timely manner and confront them with a “neutralizing” effort.
The impact management carried out by the Dutch government in alignment with Muslim
organizations after the movie Fitna was broadcast, was a positive exception.
Second, it can be noticed that with Islamic radicals, brokers of injustice play a much
larger role. These brokers include the “entrepreneurs of violence,” who consciously and
premeditatedly exaggerate and disseminate all sorts of “signifiers.” The South Moluccan
youths reacted spontaneously and collectively, as “bunches of guys,”73 to moments they
perceived as significant, not only to them, but to their community as a whole. No professional
firebrands or organized campaigns could be identified. On the other hand, the authorities
did find in the case of Islamic radical groups much more evidence of “hate mongers,” self-
appointed, travelling preachers of hate that stir up feelings of resentment. Their presence
makes it harder to invalidate radical legends.
One conclusion that can be drawn is that with Islamic radicals, the “supply side” is
much more elusive and resists neutralizing efforts that could be applied in the Moluccan
case. In the present situation of Islamic radicals it is therefore much more feasible to direct
deradicalization initiatives to the demand side of the radical movement and try to make
radical ideology less appealing to potential members and new generations. The key lies
in combating the perception of exclusion among Muslims and in supporting democratic
initiatives that rival the radical ideology of oppression and injustice.
A third and last interesting point of comparison can be made regarding the timing of,
on the one hand, reactive and repressive government actions (through police, intelligence
surveillance activities) and on the other, of initiatives aimed at neutralizing, appeasing,
and integrating radical groups. As stated earlier, “counterterrorism strategies should not
unreflectively impinge on deradicalization initiatives.” However, in the history of Moluc-
can deradicalization it became clear that both measures were required and could not be
substituted for one another. The brutal termination of the train hijacking was necessary to
direct the attention of the radical youths to more peaceful alternatives of Moluccan engage-
ment. Only after a military display of power and six casualties within their own ranks did
doubts over the attainability of the RMS ideal through violence begin to emerge within
the Moluccan community itself, the (covert) support for violent protest decline, and other
initiatives gain more support.
How can one explain this difference in sensibility to a display of strength by the
government between Moluccan and Islamic radicals? Moluccans might have shied away
from violent actions because of the brutal raid on the train; Islamic radicals would, however,
most probably only find new evidence for injustice and humiliation in such an assault (as was
the case with the many arrests and searches that have forcibly been carried out since 2001).
This difference can be partly explained by pointing to Moluccan culture and background.
The Moluccan youths came from a military tradition, where demonstrating military power
and decisiveness earned the government some respect. Islamic radicals do not share this
military culture and respond differently to overt acts of repression.
Another explanation lies in the question of the timing of these harsh responses. Ob-
viously, one can identify internal dynamics and a cycle of mobilization and protest within
radical movements. The support for those radical groups within their constituency is not a
constant factor: it increases, but can decline as well. Identifying the stages of this support cy-
cle is essential for determining which countermeasure is most appropriate. From the history
of Moluccan violence, but also from that of the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA),74 it
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can be concluded that a “soft” approach, aimed at dialogue, reconciliation, negotiation, or
even exit had less effect, when the level of support within the radical constituency was still
relatively high.
One might suggest therefore that a display of governmental strength through harsh
counterterrorism measures can be efficient but have a higher rate of success when the
terrorist or radical constituency already displays signs of weariness (caused by too many
victims within their own ranks or too-violent attacks). The government can reinforce this
process by explicitly bringing these downsides of terrorist attacks to the constituencies’
attention, while simultaneously isolating and targeting the radical “die hards.” In the case
of the Islamic radicals, one could argue that—on the one hand—within the broader com-
munity of Muslims and North African immigrants, the indignation and frustration about
discrimination and perceived acts of injustice is still so high and—on the other hand—the
number of terrorists and attacks so low (at present, only three convicted terrorists remain
in prison), that exceptionally harsh responses are not accepted (yet), but on the contrary
would only serve to heighten existing tensions.
Concluding Remarks
Based on the analysis of the two case studies, it can be concluded that not only governmental
interventions, but also the discourse that is produced or reinforced through these interven-
tions, have a profound effect on processes of deradicalization—an effect this article has
tried to make visible through applying the concepts of signifiers, legends, and neutralizers.
The main difference with deradicalization strategies in the 1970s and the principal
hindrance for the current counterterrorism policy is the fact that nowadays, public opinion
and politicians alike display a much larger interest in terrorism, and that political and public
discourse on these issues is much tougher and more intransigent than it was in the 1970s.
Today—at least in the Netherlands—incidents involving Moroccans or Muslims, whether
concerning assaults on bus drivers, ambulance personnel, or Moroccan “pimps” are placed
in a context of a diffuse terrorist threat. This negative discourse of threat has not been
limited to radical factions, but has become generalized over the whole Muslim population,
which has certainly facilitated radicalization.
Against this backdrop, many more potential and real signifiers have occurred, fueling
the legends of injustice, oppression, and discrimination that form the bricks of a radical
ideology. Deradicalization policies thus often compete against a public moral panic that
is hard to confront. It is therefore of paramount importance that the government, and
its constitutive organs, refrain from fanning the already intemperate public discourse on
terrorism. Regarding the radical movement that should be countered, it is crucial to identify
existing signifiers and corresponding legends in a timely manner and anticipate possible new
ones. The government should facilitate strategies, in close cooperation with organizations
that represent the broader constituency that the radicals tap into, to confront those legends
with “neutralizers” or “counternarratives” and to isolate the “entrepreneurs of violence.”
What is of primary importance here is that combating terrorism is itself a form of
communication, just as terrorism itself is. The formulation and implementation of coun-
terterrorism strategy is a matter of establishing what is under threat, from whom or from
what that threat is coming, and how far one can go to avert that threat. In this discussion,
the values of a society are assumed, either implicitly or explicitly, and thereby what is
considered deviant. Terrorists receive and interpret these messages; they try to distort them
and to use them as “fodder” for their ideology of oppression and injustice. Only when
424 F. Demant and B. de Graaf
democratic governments succeed in shattering the myths and half-truth of repression will
they manage to take the wind out of the terrorists’ sails.75
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in den 70er Jahren (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 2008).
14. Cf. Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State, pp. 60–61.
15. De Graaf, De strijd tegen terrorisme, chapter 10. See also De Graaf, “Counternarratives and
the Unrehearsed Stories Counterterrorists Unwittingly Produce,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 3(2),
pp. 5–11.
16. In social-constructivist discourse analysis, “signifiers” are empty shells or concepts that
have to be filled with meaning before they constitute a discourse. See Louise J. Phillips and Mari-
anne Jørgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London/New Delhi: SAGE, 2002), pp.
50–51. Here, this concept is used not in a strictly social constructivist sense, but in an empirical-
historical manner. “Signifiers” are not mere words or concepts, but can also be incidents or historical
occurrences. These subsequently have to be interpreted and filled with meaning as well.
How to Counter Radical Narratives 425
17. See U. Soukup, Wie starb Benno Ohnesorg? Der 2. Juni 1967 (Berlin: Verlag 1990, 2007).
18. In May 2009 the BStU exposed Kurras as an Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (an informal em-
ployee, i.e., an informer) of the East German Ministry of State Security, the so-called Stasi. He
thus appeared to have been a communist, rather than a fascist. It is not clear whether Kurras also
acted as an agent provocateur, under orders of the Stasi to destabilize the young Republic. There
is no evidence of that in the files. German experts on the matter, such as Aust, Kraushaar, or Uwe
Timm leave that possibility open, but are cautious. From Stasi-files, it appears that the Stasi itself
considered Ohnesorg’s death to be an accident. Kurras was depicted as “very much in love with
guns.” Cf. also “Vielleicht war es nicht die NS-Vergangenheit,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 23 May
2009; “Kurras gesteht IM-Tätigkeit,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 May 2009; “Der Schuss,
der die Republik veränderte,” FAZ, 24 May 2009; “Es wäre trotzdem zur Protestbewegung gekom-
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